G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment by Richard H. Clarida et al.
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability
and Adjustment
Volume Author/Editor: Richard H. Clarida, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-10726-4
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/clar06-2
Conference Date: June 1-2, 2005
Publication Date: May 2007
Title: Are There Thresholds of Current Account Adjustment
in the G7?
Author: Richard H. Clarida, Manuela Goretti, Mark P. Taylor
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0120169
5.1 Introduction
The sustainability and adjustment of current account imbalances
among the world’s major industrialized countries is a subject that is re-
ceiving considerable attention among policymakers, ﬁnancial market
practitioners, and academics. At more than $600 billion and nearly 6 per-
cent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), the U.S. current account deﬁcit
attracts the most focus, but there are also material current account imbal-
ances in other deﬁcit countries, such as the United Kingdom, and in sur-
plus countries, such as Japan and Germany.
Some respected experts have expressed concern that current account im-
balances of this magnitude and persistence indicate that the global econ-
omy is operating in a danger zone in which disruptive and volatile reactions
in currency, bond, and equity markets are likely to result. For example,
C. Fred Bergsten (2002, 5) has argued that “research at both the Federal
Reserve Board and the Institute for International Economics reveals that
industrial countries, including the United States, enter a danger zone of
current account unsustainability when their deﬁcits reach 4–5 percent of
G D P ....  A t  t h e s e  l e v e l s ,  corrective forces tend to arise either sponta-
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rate revaluation of the U.S. foreign asset position.neously from market forces or by policy action.” Other observers have
made a similar point, arguing that there is a threshold current account im-
balance beyond which current account adjustment must ultimately take
place, even if evidence of adjustment is scarce or nonexistent before the
threshold is reached. This point of view is represented clearly in a recent
survey paper on this subject prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City (Holman 2001):
While there is considerable uncertainty about the precise threshold . . .
a current account deﬁcit greater than 4.2 percent of GDP is unsustain-
able. This estimate, based on the 1980s and early 1990s, represents the
average threshold at which current account deﬁcits in several industrial-
ized economies started to narrow after trending up for a sustained pe-
riod. (16)
Existing empirical work on this subject is suggestive but is not in fact
speciﬁcally aimed at answering the question, Are there thresholds of cur-
rent account adjustment? or exploring its implications. Inﬂuential papers
by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Freund (2000) employ a careful
and informative methodology to pull together a set of empirical regulari-
ties about how adjustments of large current account deﬁcits have taken
place in previous episodes that meet certain ex ante criteria. For example,
in order for a current account deﬁcit adjustment episode (called a reversal)
to be included in the Freund sample, it must meet the following four cri-
teria:
1. The current account deﬁcit exceeded 2 percent of GDP before the re-
versal.
2. The average deﬁcit was reduced by at least 2 percent of GDP over
three years (from the minimum to the three-year average).
3. The maximum deﬁcit in the ﬁve years after the reversal was not larger
than the minimum deﬁcit in the three years before the reversal.
4. The current account was reduced by at least one-third.
These are very similar to the criteria introduced by Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin (1998) in their study. Their motivation for focusing on the adjust-
ment of large current account deﬁcits that meet these criteria is explained
as follows:
In the deﬁnition of reversal events we want to capture large and persis-
tent improvements in the current account imbalance, that go beyond
short-run current account ﬂuctuations as a result of consumption
smoothing. The underlying idea is that “large” events provide more in-
formation on determinants of reductions in current account deﬁcits
than short run ﬂuctuations. (12)
The work of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998), Freund (2000) and—us-
ing a somewhat diﬀerent methodology—Mann (2002) has had an impact
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cially in the context of the record U.S. deﬁcits recorded in recent years. For
example, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan (2003), citing Freund’s
work has said:
[W]hat do we know about whether the process of reining in our current
account deﬁcit will be benign to the economies of the United States and
the world? According to a Federal Reserve staﬀ study, current account
deﬁcits that emerged among developed countries since 1980 have risen
as high as double-digit percentages of GDP before markets enforced a
reversal. The median high has been about 5 percent of GDP.
While much can be and has been learned by studying past episodes of ad-
justment of large current account deﬁcits (as deﬁned by the criteria used by
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin [1998] and Freund [2000]), there remains a num-
ber of unresolved empirical questions pertaining to the modeling, estima-
tion, and interpretation of the current adjustment process among the large
industrialized countries. These questions include the following:
• Does the process of adjusting to current account deﬁcits diﬀer from
the process of adjusting to current account surpluses? (Does sign
matter?)
• Does the process of adjusting to large current account imbalances
diﬀer from the process of adjusting to smaller current imbalances?
(Does size matter?)
• If so, is there a way to estimate how large is “large,” and does this esti-
mate diﬀer from country to country? (Does one size ﬁt all?)
• Is the absence of evidence about the adjustment of a large current ac-
count imbalance evidence in favor of the sustainability of said large
imbalance? (Is the absence of evidence evidence of sustainability?)
It is the aim of this paper to provide an empirical framework that can be
used to begin to answer questions such as these. We will argue that, for any
particular country, all four of these issues are, in fact, intrinsically related
to one another and to the speciﬁcation of the econometric model that best
describes that country’s current account dynamics. If the current account,
suitably scaled by net output (GDP net of investment and government pur-
chases), is a linear, stationary stochastic process with a constant uncondi-
tional mean, as is often assumed in empirical work, then the answers to
these four questions are straightforward: no, no, moot, and yes.
An immediate implication of stationarity is that any current account or
net output ratio not equal to the unconditional mean is unsustainable by
the deﬁnition of a stationary stochastic process. This applies to surpluses
as well as deﬁcits. However, as an empirical matter, the dynamic process by
which the current account adjusts to its unconditional mean depends cru-
cially on whether the process is linear or nonlinear. In particular, if the pro-
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librium, and the speed of adjustment is independent of the magnitude of
the displacement from long-run equilibrium (the unconditional mean).
For a linear, stationary current account-net output process, there is noth-
ing to be gained by just focusing on the adjustment of current account
deﬁcits and excluding the data on adjustment to surpluses (all relative to
the unconditional mean current account to net output ratio which may be
either positive or negative). Moreover, there is no reason to focus on the ad-
justment to large deﬁcits as providing diﬀerent or more information than
episodes of adjustment to small deﬁcits (relative to the unconditional
mean) as all episodes provide the same information. Finally, as should be
obvious by now, for a linear stationary stochastic process, there is no par-
ticular threshold beyond which markets or shifts in policy force a reversal
and below which adjustment is absent.
By contrast, if the stationary stochastic process that governs the current
account adjustment to its long mean is nonlinear, then both the “sign” and
“size” of the current account imbalance do matter for the adjustment pro-
cess, and the size of the current account imbalance beyond which adjust-
ment takes place may well be country speciﬁc (as alluded to by Chairman
Greenspan and as is suggested by the empirical work cited previously).
Finally, if the stationary stochastic process is nonlinear, absence of evi-
dence of adjustment of a large current account imbalance is not evidence
of the absence of the ultimate adjustment of the imbalance.
There is a tractable and testable nonlinear time series model that conve-
niently exhibits all of the features of the current account adjustment pro-
cess that have been the focus of recent discussions and that nests as a spe-
cial case the linear stationary stochastic process model for the current
account that is often assumed in empirical work. It is the threshold auto-
regression model introduced in Tong (1978) and studied extensively by
Hansen (1996, 1999a,b). For a stationary stochastic threshold model with
mean   and thresholds   and    , there is no tendency for ca   current ac-
count/net output –   to adjust to its mean of 0 unless it has crossed either
the threshold   or the threshold    . In the regime with  
 
  ca     , deﬁcits
or surpluses (relative to  ) persist, and there is no tendency for imbalances
to revert. However, the absence of evidence of mean reversion in this
regime is not evidence that deﬁcits or surpluses relative to  are sustainable
as, by stationarity, the only sustainable current account imbalance is equal
to the unconditional mean.
In a threshold model, a necessary condition for adjustment to com-
mence is for ca to cross either the deﬁcit threshold  
 
or the surplus thresh-
old    , parameters that can be estimated from the data, not imposed ex ante.
In the deﬁcit adjustment regime, ca   
 
, and cat   
 
cat–1   εt. Adjustment
continues until ca reaches  
 
at which point any further adjustment is driven
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   cat–1  εt. Adjustment continues until ca reaches    at which point any fur-
ther adjustment is driven by shocks to εt. Evidently, in a threshold model,
the sign and size of the ca imbalance can matter, thresholds can diﬀer
across countries, and the absence of evidence of adjustment is not the evi-
dence of absence of future adjustment of the ca imbalance.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 5.2, we review some basic
empirical predictions of the modern workhorse model of the current ac-
count, the rational expectations, intertemporal approach model developed
in Sachs (1981, 1982), estimated by Sheﬀrin and Woo (1990), and recently
extended by Kano (2003). The basic prediction of this model, once one al-
lows for permanent shocks to the level of net output as in Campbell and
Deaton (1989), is that the ratio of the current account to net output (GDP
less investment less government purchases) should be a stationary sto-
chastic process with an unconditional mean determined by the relation-
ship between the real interest rate and the per capita rate of growth. We
also argue that a general equilibrium, two-country version of the Weil
(1989) inﬁnite horizon, overlapping generations model of the current ac-
count—a model in which the global real interest rate and the net foreign
asset or liability position of each country is endogenously determined—
also has the prediction that the current account to net output ratio is con-
stant in steady state and determined by underlying parameters such as
rates of time preference, the steady-state rate of global growth, and the rel-
ative size of the two countries. In our paper, we will follow most of the em-
pirical work in this area and take the stationarity of the current account to
net output ratio as given. The question at the heart of the present paper is
whether the stationary stochastic process that describes the current ac-
count to net output ratio in the G7 countries features linear or nonlinear
adjustment to the unconditional mean. We conclude section 5.2 by pre-
senting, for each G7 country, the results of a nonparametric statistical test
of the null hypothesis of a linear adjustment of the current account to net
output ratio against the alternative of nonlinear adjustment, using quar-
terly data for the sample 1979:1 to 2003:3. This is an application of a test
for nonlinearity developed by Terasvirta (1994). For the G7 countries in
our sample, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence against the null of lin-
ear adjustment of the current account to net output ratio and in favor of
the alternative of nonlinear adjustment.
In section 5.3 of the paper, we estimate for each G7 country a threshold
autoregressive model of the current account to net output ratio, allowing
for country-speciﬁc thresholds of current account surplus and deﬁcit
adjustment in each country (as suggested, for example, by Chairman
Greenspan’s comments) and also allowing for country speciﬁc means for
the ratio of the current account to net output (as suggested, for example,
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5.2). Our main ﬁndings in this section are as follows. For most of the G7
countries, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of threshold eﬀects in current ac-
count adjustment. We also ﬁnd that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
a random walk for the current account imbalance in each country when
that ratio does not exceed (in absolute value) the country-speciﬁc surplus
and deﬁcit thresholds (relative to the country speciﬁc mean) estimated for
that country. For most of the G7 countries, unless the current account im-
balance is too large—as suggested by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998)—
there does not appear to be a systematic tendency for adjustment to occur.
A further advantage of our approach is that we can estimate from the data
how large a current imbalance has to be before this imbalance triggers an
adjustment, and we can allow these estimated thresholds to diﬀer across
countries. In fact, we ﬁnd substantial cross-country variation in the surplus
and deﬁcit thresholds that trigger current account adjustment in each
country. We also ﬁnd evidence of cross-country and cross-regime variation
in the autoregressive dynamics estimated during adjustment regimes for
each country.
In section 5.4, we investigate what happens to the probability distribu-
tions of nominal exchange rate changes, stock price index changes, and
long-term interest rate diﬀerentials during the various current account ad-
justment regimes that we estimate for each country in section 5.3. The mo-
tivation is to determine whether crossing the current account adjustment
threshold is itself associated with shifts in the probability distributions
for exchange rates, stock prices, and interest diﬀerentials. We speciﬁcally
account for—and allow for current account regime-speciﬁc shifts in—
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity as well as for shifts in the
mean by estimating generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroske-
dastic (GARCH) models for nominal exchange rate changes, stock prices
changes, and interest diﬀerentials. We also in this section explore, for the
United States, whether the expectation of a future adjustment in the cur-
rent account imbalance is associated with a present shift in the probability
distribution of exchange rates, stock prices, or interest diﬀerentials. We
proxy this by including in the GARCH models two dummy variables (one
for deﬁcits and one for surpluses) that represent the distance between the
current account imbalance and its country-speciﬁc mean when the imbal-
ance is between the thresholds.
In section 5.5, we draw on our empirical results to take stock of the pres-
ent U.S. current account deﬁcit. Our empirical results indicate that com-
pared to other G7 countries, the United States over our sample exhibited
relatively wide thresholds within which current account adjustment is ab-
sent and relatively slow speeds of adjustment once these thresholds, espe-
cially the deﬁcit threshold, are crossed. Moreover, the present U.S. current
account deﬁcit substantially exceeds—and has for some time—our esti-
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States. We explore several possible explanations. The ﬁrst is that the thresh-
old model, while a useful description of current account adjustment for
other G7 countries, does not apply to the United States and that the pres-
ent deﬁcit of nearly 6 percent of GDP is, in fact, sustainable. The second
explanation is that there are thresholds of current account adjustment for
the United States, but that adjustment has been delayed over the past sev-
eral years, due to unusual circumstances that were not in evidence during
the sample over which the models were estimated, 1979 to 2003. These cir-
cumstances could include (a) the low level of global real interest rates
(which support higher levels of investment and lower levels of saving in the
United States than would be the case with historically average or above av-
erage real interest rates); (b) the more muted and less uniform decline in the
dollar than occurred, for example, during the 1985 to 1987 Plaza-Louvre
episode (reﬂecting the intervention activities of Asian central banks); (c)
the fact that the United States continues to run a substantial surplus in
dividends, interest, and proﬁts on its stock of foreign assets compared with
the dividends, interest, and proﬁts that it pays out on its much larger stock
of foreign liabilities; and (d) the adjustment in the net foreign liability po-
sition of the United States that occurs as a result of dollar deprecia-
tion (which in 2003 oﬀset almost 80 percent of that year’s current account
deﬁcit). We review and evaluate these potential explanations for the ab-
sence of adjustment to date in the U.S. current account deﬁcit even though
it has passed well beyond thresholds that would have triggered adjustments
in other G7 countries.
Section 5.6 provides some concluding remarks.
5.2 A Test for Nonlinear Current Account Adjustment
5.2.1 Theoretical Considerations
In our empirical work, we shall be modeling the dynamics of G7 current
account adjustment. However, it is important to take a stand as to exactly
what it is to which G7 current account imbalances are adjusting. In this pa-
per, we draw on the implications for long-run current account equilibrium
of the workhorse intertemporal model of the current account (Sachs 1981;
Sheﬀrin and Woo 1990, via Campbell 1987). This model can be written
CAt   –Et Σ(1   r)–i Zt i, where Zt   Y t – It – Gt is the level of net output.
The intertemporal approach models have been estimated and tested many
times, and their high frequency implications—that current account dy-
namics are fully described by the discounted sum of future changes in net
output—are usually rejected. However, we argue that the intertemporal
model, properly speciﬁed to allow for stationarity in long-run growth
rates, contains an important insight about the long-run behavior of the
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tionary. Following Campbell and Deaton (1989), it is straightforward to
show (Kano 2003) that the log-linear approximation of the intertemporal
approach model is given by CAt/Zt   Et Σ(1   r – g)–i zt i, where g is the
unconditional mean of  zt. Note that if the log diﬀerence of net output is
stationary, it is the current account to net output ratio that is stationary,
not simply the current account itself. This seems like a more sensible long-
run equilibrium condition than to assume that the current account itself is
stationary.
The intertemporal approach model is partial equilibrium and is usually
studied for the special case in which ris equal to the rate of time preference.
However, the basic prediction of that model—that the ratio CA/Z is con-
stant in the long run—also holds in the steady state of a two-country ver-
sion of Weil’s (1989) inﬁnite horizon overlapping generations model. As
shown in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1994, 188), the Weil model with discount
factor   implies that the steady-state current account to net output ratio is
constant and given by CA/Z   (n   g) , where n is the rate of population
growth, g is the rate of net output growth, and   is the endogenous ratio of
net foreign assets to net output given by the solution to  [1 – (1   r) /(1  
n)(1   g)]   [(1   r)  – (1   g)]/(1   n)(1   g)(r – g). Now imagine two
such economies trading goods and bonds with one another that diﬀer in
two respects: size and the discount factor. Let  1    2, and suppose that
country 2 is larger than country 1. It is easy to show that in the steady state
of a two-country version of the Weil model, the  1 smaller country will run
a steady state current account to net output deﬁcit and the larger, more pa-
tient  2 country will run a steady-state current account to net output sur-
plus. Based on these considerations, we shall assume that for each G7
country, the ratio CA/Zis stationary and allow for country-speciﬁc means
in the CA/Z ratio.
5.2.2 Testing for Nonlinearities in G7 Current Account Adjustment
This paper is an empirical study of G7 current account adjustment,
based on quarterly data for the period 1979:1 to 2003:3 (the data available
when we began our study in the fall of 2003). We choose our starting date
to begin six years after the advent of ﬂoating exchange rates and the initial
globalization of the international capital market that occurred at that time
and in conjunction with the ﬁrst oil shock. The data in the analysis are ob-
tained from the International Financial Statistics Database by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). All variables are seasonally adjusted and
expressed in national currency. According to national account statistics,
the current account variable is estimated as the sum of net exports and net
primary income from abroad (NPIA); net output is obtained by subtract-
ing government consumption expenditure and gross ﬁxed capital forma-
tion (investment) to GDP.
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following the nonparametric test for nonlinearity developed by Luukko-
nen, Saikkonen, and Terasvirta (1988) and Terasvirta (1994). These au-
thors propose a Lagrange Multiplier test for a third-order Taylor approxi-
mation to the regression function of the form cat    00   ΣP
i 1( 1icat–1  
 2icat–icat–d    3icat–ica2
t–d   4icat–ica3
t–d)   εt. This artiﬁcial regression al-
lows to identify general nonlinearity through the signiﬁcance of the higher
order terms. The main advantage of this type of test is that it can be carried
out by simple ordinary least squares (OLS) and that—despite being de-
signed for smooth transition regressions—is sensitive to a wide range of
nonlinearities (Granger and Terasvirta 1993) although there is reason to
suspect that the power of the test may be weak against some nonlinear al-
ternatives. The results of this test are reported in table 5.1.
Hence, evidence of nonlinear adjustment is indicated at the 5-percent
signiﬁcance level for France, Germany and Japan and at the 7-percent level
for the United States.
Using the multivariate bootstrap test procedure developed by Hansen
(1997), the null hypothesis of linear adjustment in all countries is rejected
at the 14-percent level. Given the possibly poor power characteristics of
these tests, therefore, we felt encouraged to investigate the estimation of
nonlinear models more directly.
5.3 Estimating and Testing Thresholds Models 
of G7 Current Account Adjustment
In this section of the paper, we estimate and test for each G7 country a
threshold autoregression model of the current account to net output ratio
using the univariate approach developed in Hansen (1996). We allow for
and estimate country-speciﬁc means, country- and regime-speciﬁc thresh-
olds, and country- and regime-speciﬁc dynamic adjustment once the cur-
rent account has crossed either of the thresholds. Letting ca   CA/Z –  ,
we write the equilibrium threshold autoregressive (TAR) model as
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Table 5.1







United States 0.069(1) cat       1(cat d,    )   cat 1   
 
  1(cat d,  
 
)   cat 1
  [1   1(cat d,    )]   [1   1(cat d,  
 
)]   cat 1   et,
where 1(cat–d,  
 
) is an indicator function that takes on a value of 1 when
cat–d       0 (and zero otherwise), and 1(cat–d,  
 
) is an indicator function
that takes on a value of 1 when cat–d   
 
  0 (and zero otherwise). This ap-
proach postulates that the persistence of the current account imbalance in
a country may depend upon whether the current account imbalance has
crossed a surplus threshold of       0 or a deﬁcit threshold of  
 
  0. We
note that a special case of the threshold model is the case in which       
 
 
0 and      
 
 1, in which case it collapses to a linear stationary AR(1) pro-
cess. We experimented with a threshold TAR(2) speciﬁcation but found in
general the second lag terms to be insigniﬁcant and thus conﬁne our pres-
entation to the TAR(1) models. We also select a delay parameter d of two
quarters as this maximizes the ﬁt of the regression in each case.
The threshold model can potentially identify three regimes of current
account adjustment: a surplus adjustment regime; a deﬁcit adjustment
regime; and an inertia regime      cat–2   
 
, in which the current account
appears to follow a random walk. In a more general, smooth threshold
transition autoregressive (STAR) model (e.g., Taylor, Peel, and Sarno
2001), the speed of adjustment does not increase discontinuously at the
threshold; rather, the further way is the current account to GDP ratio from
its long-run mean, the faster the current account imbalance adjusts. Inter-
estingly, when we experimented with estimating smooth transmission
models, we found they did not capture G7 current account dynamics in a
sensible way. As we shall report next, there does in fact appear to be im-
portant, discrete threshold eﬀects that inﬂuence current account adjust-
ment.
Before presenting the results, we will discuss some issues involved in the
estimation and testing of these models for a system comprised of the G7
countries. The ca variables for the G7 group are ﬁrst demeaned, in order to
allow for the existence of long-run deﬁcit or surplus means for each coun-
try rather than a zero ca balance. A nonzero mean proves to be applicable
for all G7 countries, with the single exception of Italy. In particular, we de-
tect a structural break in the German series in 1991, corresponding with
the German uniﬁcation and the resulting change in the country national
accounts; we account for the break by allowing two diﬀerent means in the
current account for the pre- and postuniﬁcation periods.
The two asymmetric thresholds in the TAR model are selected jointly by
minimization of the overall sum of squared errors. The estimation method
involves a double grid search over ca. Following Hansen (1997), the range





) and the 85th percentile (c  a  ). This reduction in the grid range
is needed in order to avoid sorting too few observations in one regime for
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], for     and  
 
respectively.
As the minimization process for a three-regime or two-threshold TAR
process is numerically intensive, we rely on the estimation methodology
proposed by Hansen (1999a) for multiple thresholds. This consists of a
three-stage grid search, where the second-stage estimation of the two-
threshold model is made conditional on the ﬁrst-stage, single-threshold es-
timate of   (either     or  
 
), the third stage being used as a reﬁnement.
Furthermore, ﬁnal estimates of slope parameters and standard errors
for the G7 group of countries are obtained by seemingly unrelated regres-
sion (SUR) estimation, in order to allow for potential correlation between
the disturbances of the diﬀerent ca equations due to common unobserv-
able factors.
Once the thresholds have been selected, according to standard asymp-
totic theory, (1) is linear in the parameters. As with any simple dummy-
variable regression, it can be estimated by linear methods. However, statis-
tical inference in a TAR model bears the diﬃculty that the thresholds    and
 
 
may not be identiﬁed under the null hypothesis in question (Davies
1987). In this case, the usual chi-square distribution needs to be replaced
by an approximated empirical distribution obtained by bootstrapping the
residuals (Hansen 1997). In particular, artiﬁcial observations are cali-
brated using the restricted estimates and are then used to obtain new esti-
mates of the restricted and unrestricted model (for an application, see Peel
and Taylor 2002). The percentage of bootstrap samples—we run 1000
replications—for which the simulated likelihood-ratio statistics exceed the
actual one forms the bootstrap approximation to the p-value of the test sta-
tistic under question.
The estimation and testing results are presented in table 5.2. First, the
test results: when we test the null hypothesis a single threshold for all coun-
tries versus the alternative hypothesis of two thresholds, we reject the null
hypothesis in favor of the alternative. This is consistent with three regimes
for each country—a surplus adjustment regime, a deﬁcit adjustment
regime, and an inertia (absence of adjustment) regime. Second, when we
test the hypothesis that the current account follows a random walk inside
the inertia regime against the alternative that it follows a mean reverting
autoregressive process inside the inertia regime (a more general formula-
tion of the threshold model), we are unable to reject the null of a random
walk inside the inertia regime. In summary, the statistical tests ﬁnd evi-
dence of nonlinear current account adjustment and also identify signiﬁ-
cant thresholds beyond which current account adjustment takes place.
We now discuss the parameter estimates for the threshold models esti-
mated for each G7 country. To repeat, these estimates allow for country-
speciﬁc means, country- and regime-speciﬁc thresholds, and country- and
regime-speciﬁc autoregressive dynamics. A number of interesting results
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we see there is wide cross-country variation in the estimated current ac-
count deﬁcit adjustment thresholds. For example, the estimated deﬁcit ad-
justment threshold for the United States is –2.18 percent of net output,
while for Japan it is only –0.18 percent of net output. This means that em-
pirically, there is no evidence from these estimates of systematic adjust-
ment in the U.S. current account deﬁcit until the deﬁcit exceeds –4.19 per-
cent of net output (equal to the mean of –2.01 plus the threshold of –2.18),
while for Japan, adjustment begins to take place when the surplus falls be-
low 3.77 percent of net output (equal to the mean of 3.95 plus the deﬁcit
threshold of –0.18). We estimate a similar pattern for the other structural
surplus countries, France and Germany. For France, we estimate that ad-
justment begins to take place once the surplus falls below 0.51 percent of
net output; for Germany adjustment begins to take place once the surplus
falls below the mean of 6.19 before uniﬁcation and 1.19 percent after uni-
ﬁcation. Second, we see that for most G7 countries, there are thresholds of
adjustment to current account surpluses as well as for current account
deﬁcits. Third, we see from table 5.3 substantial cross-country variation in
the estimated autoregressive dynamics once countries cross their current
account deﬁcit or surplus thresholds. For deﬁcit adjustment episodes, the
estimated autoregressive coeﬃcients range from 0.827 for Germany to
0.973 for the United States. For surplus adjustment episodes, the estimated
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Table 5.2 Threshold models of de-meaned CA/NO (Q1:1979–Q3:2003)
Thresholds 
Slope coeﬃcients  (asymmetric band)
(estimation by SUR) Means
Upper Lower 
Country threshold threshold Above Band Below Surplus Deﬁcit
Canada 1.41 –4.05 0.927 1.000 0.930 –1.792
(0.048) (0.060)
France 2.13 –1.13 0.931 1.000 0.910 1.646
(0.048) (0.045)
Germany 2.84 0.00 0.880 1.000 0.827 6.185 Pre-1991
(0.070) (0.064) 1.496 Post-1991
Italy 0.00 –0.37 0.944 1.000 0.867 –0.269
(0.058) (0.059)
Japan 0.84 –0.18 0.908 1.000 0.894 3.951
(0.058) (0.037)
United Kingdom 1.08 0.00 0.777 1.000 0.929 –1.764
(0.073) (0.064)
United States 2.15 –2.18 0.907 1.000 0.973 –2.011
(0.039) (0.034)
Note:Bootstrap: LR-test for band coeﬃcient equal to 1 (SUR): marginal signiﬁcance level  0.520; LR-
test for single threshold (SUR): marginal signiﬁcance level   0.004. Standard errors are in parentheses.autoregressive coeﬃcients range from 0.777 in the United Kingdom to
0.944 in Italy.
In the top panel of table 5.4, we compute the half life of 1, 2, and 3 per-
cent of net output displacements of the current account imbalance from
the deﬁcit threshold. In our equilibrium threshold model, the speed of ad-
justment to a given displacement from the deﬁcit (or surplus) threshold is
a function of the distance between the imbalances and the unconditional
mean, not just to the threshold itself (as for example would be the case for
a so-called band threshold model). As is evident from the table, the United
States stands out in terms of the slow speed of adjustment to current ac-
count deﬁcits, even when it is adjusting. For example, in response to a 2
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Table 5.3 Empirical Distribution of Current Account Regimes
United G6  United 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan Kingdom average States
Percent of sample spent in each regime
Surplus 34 23 20 51 36 37 34 20
Inertia 48 35 20 3 30 17 25 63
Deﬁcit 18 42 60 46 34 46 41 17
Adjustment per quarter during adjustment regimes (measured from peak and as percent of net output)
Surplus 0.687 0.507 1.081 0.467 0.336 0.644 0.620333 0.303
Deﬁcit 0.604 0.246 0.693 0.575 0.361 0.612 0.515167 0.327
Table 5.4 Estimated Half-life of Displacement from Current Account Threshold
1 percent 2 percent 3 percent
Half-life of displacement from deﬁcit threshold (in quarters)
Canada 1.14 2.49 3.30
France 2.64 4.08 4.79
Germany 3.65 3.64 3.64
Italy 3.18 3.84 4.13
Japan 4.79 5.48 5.69
United Kingdom 9.41 9.41 9.41
G6 average 4.17 4.82 5.16
United States 6.25 9.99 12.49
Half-life of displacement from surplus threshold (in quarters)
Canada 3.07 4.58 5.48
France 2.43 3.88 4.84
Germany 1.09 1.81 2.32
Italy 12.03 12.03 12.03
Japan 3.29 4.50 5.13
United Kingdom 1.09 1.56 1.82
G6 average 3.83 4.72 5.27
United States 1.77 2.82 3.53percent of GDP displacement of the U.S. current account from the esti-
mated deﬁcit threshold of –2.18 percent (to a deﬁcit of –4.18 percent of net
output), it takes the United States nearly ten quarters on average to close 1
percentage point of that displacement, whereas for the average G6 country
(G7 minus United States), it takes fewer than ﬁve quarters to close such a
displacement. In the bottom panel of table 5.4, we compute the half life of
1, 2, and 3 percent of net output displacements of the current account im-
balance from the upper (surplus) threshold. As before, we estimate sub-
stantial cross-country variation in the speeds of adjustment to displace-
ments of the current account away from the adjustment thresholds. Note
that the United States actually adjusts faster than the G6 average to cur-
rent account surpluses.
In table 5.3, we present some summary statistics for the three current ac-
count regimes estimated for each G7 country. We see that the average G6
(excluding the United States) country spent only roughly 25 percent of the
1979 to 2003 sample in the inertia regime and thus spent 75 percent of
the sample adjusting to either current account surpluses (34 percent of the
sample) or deﬁcits (41 percent of the sample). Of course, there is cross-
country variation, but the G6 country spending the maximum time in the
inertia regime was Canada, which spent 48 percent of sample in the inertia
regime. The United States, by contrast, spent a full 63 percent of the
sample in the inertia regime, and only 17 percent of the sample adjusting
to current account deﬁcits, and 20 percent of the time adjusting to current
account surpluses. The bottom panel of table 5.3 reports, for each country,
the average adjustment per quarter that actually occurred during the
sample (as a percentage of net output) when that country was estimated to
be in a deﬁcit adjustment regime or a surplus adjustment regime. These ad-
justments are measured from the peak current account imbalance reached
during the adjustment episode to the level reached when the adjustment
regime concludes. Thus, for the average G6 country, once current account
deﬁcits (relative to mean) peak and begin to contract, they adjust at an av-
erage rate of 0.51 percent of net output per quarter (2 percent of net out-
put per year) until adjustment concludes with the current account imbal-
ance crossing the deﬁcit adjustment threshold. The table also shows that
for the G6, on average, once current account surpluses peak and begin to
contract, they adjust at an even faster average rate 0.62 percent of net out-
put per quarter (2.4 percent of net output per year) until adjustment con-
cludes with the current account imbalance crossing the surplus adjustment
threshold. Evidently, adjustment of current account imbalances in the U.S.
data is much more sluggish than the G6 average, with the U.S. current ac-
count imbalance falling by roughly 0.3 percent of net output during each
quarter (1.2 percent per year) that the United States is in an adjustment
regime.
To summarize the results of this section, having tested and found evi-
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for each G7 country a threshold autoregressive model that allows for
asymmetric, country-speciﬁc thresholds, country-speciﬁc means, and
regime- and country-speciﬁc speeds of adjustment. We ﬁnd evidence in fa-
vor of deﬁcit as well as surplus thresholds for most countries, as well as ev-
idence of substantial cross-country diﬀerences in the amount of time spent
in the three diﬀerent regimes, as well as in the pace at which adjustments
occur. Compared with other G7 countries, the United States has large
thresholds of current account adjustment, spends relatively little time in
adjustment regimes, and adjusts slowly even when in those imbalance ad-
justment regimes. In the next section of the paper, we explore what happens
to the probability distributions of exchange rates, stock prices, and inter-
est rate diﬀerentials during current account adjustment regimes in each
country.
5.4 Exchange Rates, Stock Prices, and Interest Rates 
during Current Account Adjustment Regimes
In this section, we investigate what happens to the probability distribu-
tions of nominal exchange rate changes, stock price index changes, and
long-term interest rate diﬀerentials during the various current account ad-
justment regimes that we estimate for each country in section 5.3. The mo-
tivation is to determine whether crossing the current account adjustment
threshold is itself associated with shifts in the probability distributions for
exchange rates, stock prices, and interest diﬀerentials. We speciﬁcally ac-
count for—and allow for current account regime speciﬁc shifts in—auto-
regressive conditional heteroscedasticity as well as for shifts in the mean by
estimating GARCH models for nominal exchange rate changes, stock
prices changes, and interest diﬀerentials. We also in this section explore,
for the United States, whether the expectation of a futureadjustment in the
current account imbalance is associated with a present shift in the proba-
bility distribution for exchange rates, stock prices, or interest diﬀerentials.
Switching models of exchange rates were introduced in Engel and
Hamilton (1990). They hypothesized that the log diﬀerence in the nominal
exchange rate is a stochastic process with a regime-speciﬁc mean and a
regime-speciﬁc (but constant) variance. In their model, the regimes them-
selves are unobservable states; the probability that the exchange rate is in a
particular regime is inferred from the exchange rate data itself. Our ap-
proach is diﬀerent, but similarly motivated. Having found evidence of
three regimes of current account adjustment for each G7 country, we esti-
mate and test whether being in a current account adjustment regime is as-
sociated with shifts in the drift and variance of exchange rate changes for
that country. We allow for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in
exchange rate changes. We estimate similar models for the log diﬀerence in
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for regime speciﬁc drifts and variances.
The GARCH models we estimate in this section are of the form
(2)  t   d   d1DUMSt   d2DUMDt   ut
 t
2   c   au2
t 1   b 2
t 1   c1DUMSt   c2DUMDt,
where DUMDtis a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 when a coun-
try is in a deﬁcit adjustment regime, DUMStis a dummy variable that takes
on a value of 1 when a country is in a surplus adjustment regime,  t
2 is the
conditional variance of ut, and  t is the log diﬀerence in the exchange rate,
the log diﬀerence in the equity price index, or the interest rate diﬀerential
(adjusted for ﬁrst order autocorrelation) observed at a monthly frequency.
Thus, in each quarter in which a country is in a particular regime, there will
be three observations on the monthly change in the asset price during that
quarter. Because Italy and France were part of the European Monetary
System (EMS) during most of the sample, the behavior of their exchange
rates and interest rates reﬂected their EMS commitments to stabilize their
exchange rates vis-à-vis Germany. We exclude them from the analysis of
this section. Estimation is by maximum likelihood. For each country, we
report the results for the log (change) in the trade weighted exchange rate,
the log (change) in a broad stock market index, and the diﬀerential between
each country’s long-term interest rate and G7 average (adjusted for ﬁrst
order autocorrelation). When signiﬁcant, we also report the results for key
bilateral exchange rates. In what follows “∗∗” indicates signiﬁcance at the
5 percent level, “∗” signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level, and “†” at the 15
percent level. Data sources are the IFS for long-term interest rates and
Bloomberg for exchange rates and stock market indexes. The sample is




For the U.S. dollar index, we see that the estimated coeﬃcient on the
surplus regime dummy is positive, and the estimated coeﬃcient on the
deﬁcit regime dummy is negative (table 5.5). This means that the dollar in-
dex tends to appreciate during U.S. surplus adjustment regimes and to de-
preciate during U.S. deﬁcit adjustment regimes, although the coeﬃcients
are not measured precisely. For the pound, we estimate a statistically sig-
niﬁcant shift in the probability distribution of exchange rate changes that
coincides with U.S. surplus adjustment regimes, in favor of an appreciation
of the dollar relative to the pound. For the Canadian dollar, we estimate a
statistically signiﬁcant shift in the probability distribution of exchange rate
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depreciation of the dollar relative to the Canadian dollar. We also estimate
a statistically signiﬁcant rise in the volatility of the Canadian dollar ex-
change rate that coincides with U.S. deﬁcit adjustment regimes. For U.S.
equity prices, we estimate a signiﬁcant (at the 12 percent level) fall in eq-
uity returns during U.S. current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes. We
also estimate a signiﬁcant rise in equity volatility that occurs during U.S.
current account adjustment regimes. For long-term interest rate diﬀeren-
tials, we do estimate a signiﬁcant increase in volatility during U.S. current
account surplus adjustment regimes.
Japanese Results
For the yen index, we see that the estimated coeﬃcient on the Japan cur-
rent account surplus adjustment regime dummy is positive and signiﬁcant,
indicating that the yen index tends to appreciate during Japan’s current ac-
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Table 5.5 Asset prices during U.S. current account adjustment regimes
U.S. dollar index
 t   –.0004   .0035DUMSt – .0028DUMDt   ut
(.0028) (.0025)
 t
2   .0001 – .0325u2
t–1   .5976 2
t–1   .0002DUMSt – .0002DUMDt
(.00003) (.00003)
Pound per dollar
 t   –.0013   .0101DUMSt – .0019DUMDt   ut
(.0044)∗∗ (.0038)
 t
2   .0002   .2151u2
t–1   .6013 2
t–1   .0001DUMSt – .0002DUMDt
(.0001) (.00007)
Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar
 t   .0009   .0006DUMSt – .0044DUMDt   ut
(.0019) (.0025)∗
 t
2   .0002 – .0161u2
t–1 – .5754 2
t–1   .00001DUMSt   .0002DUMDt
(.0001) (.00007)∗∗
Equity prices
 t   .0107 – .0029DUMSt – .0139DUMDt   ut
(.0061) (.0091)†
 t
2   .0014   .0004u2
t–1   .0681 2
t–1   .00027DUMSt   .00223DUMDt
(.0004) (.0011)∗∗
Long-term interest diﬀerentials
 t   .0094 – .0154DUMSt – .0014DUMDt   ut
(.0304) (.0181)
 t
2   .0002 – .0177u2
t–1   .9788 2
t–1   .00305DUMSt   .00007DUMDt
(.0009)∗∗ (.00014)
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
†Signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level.count surplus adjustment regimes (table 5.6). For the dollar-yen exchange
rate, we estimate a statistically signiﬁcant increase in exchange rate volatil-
ity during both Japan surplus adjustment regimes and Japan deﬁcit ad-
justment regimes. We also obtain point estimates that suggest that the yen
tends to appreciate relative to the dollar during Japanese current account
surplus regimes and to depreciate during Japanese current account deﬁcit
adjustment regimes, although these coeﬃcients are not measured pre-
cisely. For Japanese equity prices, we estimate a signiﬁcant fall in equity
volatility during Japan current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes. For
long-term interest rate diﬀerentials, we do estimate a signiﬁcant increase in
volatility during both Japan’s current account surplus adjustment regimes
and current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes. We also estimate a signif-
icant widening in Japanese long-term interest diﬀerential (it becomes
larger in absolute value) during Japan’s current account surplus adjust-
ment regimes as well as a widening during Japan’s current account deﬁcit
adjustment regimes (although the latter is not signiﬁcant).
German Results
For the volatility of the deutsche mark (DM) index through 1998:12, we
see that the estimated coeﬃcient on the German current account deﬁcit
adjustment regime dummy is positive and signiﬁcant (table 5.7). For the
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Table 5.6 Asset prices during Japan current account adjustment regimes
Yen index
 t   –.0016   .0093DUMSt   .0005DUMDt   ut
(.0034)∗∗ (.0031)
 t
2   .0006 – .2115u2
t–1 – .2848 2
t–1   .00012DUMSt – .00005DUMDt
(.00013) (.00012)
Dollar per yen
 t   .0008   .0066DUMSt – .0044DUMDt   ut
(.0050) (.0048)
 t
2   .00001 – .0095u2
t–1   .9383 2
t–1   .00012DUMSt   .00008DUMDt
(.00005)∗∗ (.00003)∗∗
Equity prices
 t   –.0031   .0105DUMSt   .0093DUMDt   ut
(.0084) (.0076)
 t
2   .0006   .1245u2
t–1   .7605 2
t–1 – .00017DUMSt – .00044DUMDt
(.0003) (.00029)†
Long-term interest diﬀerentials
 t   –.1045 – .0153DUMSt – .0844DUMDt  ut
(.0344) (.0371)∗∗
 t
2   .0049   .0082u2
t–1 – .1245 2
t–1   .028796DUMSt   .03240DUMBt
(.0142)∗∗ (.01493)∗∗
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
†Signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level.dollar-DM exchange rate estimated through 1998:12, we estimate a statis-
tically signiﬁcant depreciation of the DM during German current account
deﬁcit adjustment regimes. For German equity prices, we estimate a sig-
niﬁcant fall in equity volatility during German current account deﬁcit ad-
justment regimes. For long-term interest rate diﬀerentials, we do estimate
a signiﬁcant increase in volatility during German current account deﬁcit
adjustment regimes. German interest rate diﬀerentials increase in absolute
value during deﬁcit adjustment regimes before uniﬁcation and narrow af-
ter uniﬁcation. We split the sample at uniﬁcation because of an obvious
shift in the mean of the interest diﬀerential series at that time.
U.K. and Canadian Results
For the Canadian dollar index, we see that the estimated coeﬃcient on
the Canadian current account deﬁcit adjustment regime dummy is nega-
tive and signiﬁcant, indicating that the Canadian dollar index tends to de-
preciate during Canada’s current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes (table
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Table 5.7 Asset prices during German current account adjustment regimes
DM index
 t   .0021 – .0013DUMSt – .0012DUMDt   ut
(.0014) (.0012)
 t
2   .00002   .0886u2
t–1   .1619 2
t–1   .00001DUMSt   .00003DUMDt
(.00001) (.00001)∗∗
Dollar per DM
 t   –.0058 – .0013DUMSt – .0082DUMDt   ut
(.0066) (.0053)†
 t
2   .00127   .0921u2
t–1 – .2801 2
t–1 – .00004DUMSt   .00008DUMBt
(.0004) (.00031)
Equity prices
 t   .0037 – .0025DUMSt   .0053DUMDt   ut
(.0144) (.0102)
 t
2   .0015   .0726u2
t–1   .7386 2
t–1 – .00026DUMSt – .00115DUMDt
(.0006) (.00051)∗∗
Long-term interest diﬀerentials (1979:1–1990:12)
 t   –.0129 – .0282DUMSt – .2147DUMDt   ut
(.0481) (.0541)∗∗
 t
2   .0242   .2351u2
t–1 – .0644 2
t–1   .01303DUMSt   .03635DUMDt
(.0122) (.02499)†
Long-term interest diﬀerentials (1991:1–1998:12)
 t   .0074 – .0619DUMSt – .0358DUMDt   ut
(.0927) (.0247)†
 t
2   –.0001   .0804u2
t–1   .7183 2
t–1   .01583DUMSt   .00455DUMDt
(.0152) (.00294)†
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
†Signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level.5.8). For the U.S. dollar-Canada exchange rate, we estimate a similar re-
sult, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant. For the United Kingdom, the
most noteworthy result is a signiﬁcant increase in equity returns during
current account surplus adjustment regimes, a fall in equity volatility dur-
ing U.K. current account surplus adjustment regimes, and a rise in equity
volatility during U.K. current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes (table
5.9). Because of a break in the U.K. equity price data series at 1984:1, the
U.K. equity sample is 1984:1 to 2003:9.
Summary of Results for Section 5.4.1
In this subsection, we have reported evidence of statistically signiﬁcant
shifts in the mean and variance of the probability distribution of several G7
exchange rates, equity prices, and interest rate diﬀerentials that occur in
conjunction the current account adjustment regimes estimated in section
5.3. Our approach cannot answer the question of which triggers what, but
we do ﬁnd evidence that regimes of current account adjustment do coin-
cide with shifts in the distribution of some important asset prices. The es-
timates that are signiﬁcant tend to show exchange rate depreciation during
current account deﬁcit regimes and exchange rate appreciation during cur-
rent account surplus regimes. We also ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant increases
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Table 5.8 Asset prices during U.K. current account adjustment regimes
Pound index
 t   –.0013   .0012DUMSt   .0019DUMDt   ut
(.0029) (.0028)
 t
2   .00011   .2775u2
t–1   .5646 2
t–1 – .00007DUMSt – .00008DUMDt
(.00005)† (.00005)∗
Dollar per pound
 t   .0049 – .0093DUMSt – .0035DUMDt   ut
(.0044)∗∗ (.0045)
 t
2   .00024   .1959u2
t–1   .5747 2
t–1 – .00004DUMSt   .00001DUMDt
(.0001) (.0001)
Equity prices
 t   –.0006   .0185DUMSt   .0048DUMDt   ut
(.0082)∗∗ (.0081)
 t
2   .0040   .0224u2
t–1 – .8964 2
t–1 – .00084DUMSt   .00091DUMDt
(.0003)∗∗ (.00070)
Long-term interest diﬀerentials
 t   .0312   .0073DUMSt   .0177DUMDt   ut
(.032) (.028)
 t
2   .00037   .0461u2
t–1   .9402 2
t–1   .00048DUMSt – .00037DUMDt
(.0018) (.0012)
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5.9 Asset prices during Canada current account adjustment regimes
CAD index
 t   .0002 – .0015DUMSt – .0025DUMDt   ut
(.0014) (.0017)†
 t
2   .00004   .1961u2
t–1   .4708 2
t–1 – .000002DUMSt   .000002DUMDt
(.00001) (.00002)
U.S. dollar per Canadian dollar
 t   .0003 – .0018DUMSt – .0021DUMDt   ut
(.0014) (.0018)
 t
2   .00001   .0608u2
t–1   .8727 2
t–1   .00004DUMSt   .00002DUMDt
(.00006) (.00005)
Equity prices
 t   .0051   .0030DUMSt – .0030DUMDt   ut
(.0067) (.0065)
 t
2   .0007   .0534u2
t–1   .7576 2
t–1 – .00041DUMSt – .00062DUMDt
(.0002)† (.00047)
Long-term interest diﬀerentials
 t   .1855 – .0429DUMSt   .0300DUMDt   ut
(.0605) (.0331)
 t
2   .0124   .1002u2
t–1   .6336 2
t–1   .05082DUMSt   .00013DUMDt
(.0033)† (.00396)
†Signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level.
in exchange rate volatility during current account deﬁcit adjustment
regimes for the United States, Japan, and Germany. For equity markets, we
estimate that current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes are associated
with signiﬁcantly lower U.S. equity returns and higher U.S. equity volatil-
ity, while in the United Kingdom, equity returns are higher during current
account surplus adjustment regimes, equity volatility is lower, while U.K.
equity volatility is higher during current account deﬁcit adjustment
regimes.
5.4.2 Do Expectations of Future U.S. Current Account Adjustment
Trigger Adjustment in Present Asset Prices?
We now explore, for the United States, whether the expectation of a fu-
tureadjustment in the current account imbalance is associated with a pres-
ent shift in the probability distribution for exchange rates, stock prices, or
interest diﬀerentials. As discussed previously, compared with other G7
countries, the United States has wide thresholds of current account ad-
justment, spends relatively little time in adjustment regimes, and—as
shown in table 5.3—adjusts slowly even when in deﬁcit or surplus adjust-
ment regimes. To capture the hypothesis that expectations of future cur-
rent account adjustment may have an impact on present asset prices, we
augment our basic GARCH speciﬁcation to include two additional
dummy variables. Let DUMBD equal one when –2.18   ca   –1, and letDUMBS equal one when 1   ca   2.15. Thus DUMBD equals one when
the current account deﬁcit is more than 1 percentage point below its mean
but still less (in absolute value) than the deﬁcit threshold, while DUMBD
equals one when the current account is more than 1 percentage point above
its mean but still less (in absolute value) than the surplus threshold. Our
speciﬁcation becomes
(3)  t   d   d1DUMSt   d2DUMDt   d3DUMBSt   d4DUMBDt   ut
 t
2   c   au2
t 1   b 2
t 1   c1DUMSt   c2DUMDt   c3DUMSt
  c4DUMBDt.
In order to focus on signiﬁcant results, we proceed in two steps. In the
ﬁrst step, we estimate speciﬁcation (3). In the second step, we drop any
dummy variable that in the ﬁrst-stage estimate is not signiﬁcant at the 15
percent level or better. The results are reported in table 5.10.
From table 5.10, we see that when current account deﬁcits are large but
before the United States enters a current account deﬁcit adjustment
regime, the dollar index starts to depreciate, at a pace of roughly 7 percent
per year. We also see that the volatility of the dollar index is lower when
deﬁcits are small but before the United States enters a current account sur-
plus adjustment regime. As for equity prices, the results reported in table
5.5 are robust to the inclusion of the two additional dummy variables. We
continue to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of current account deﬁcit ad-
justment regimes on equity returns and a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on eq-
uity volatility. Interestingly, we also ﬁnd that equity volatility is lower when
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Table 5.10 Asset prices before and during U.S. current account adjustment regimes
U.S. dollar index
 t   .0006 – .0064DUMDt   ut
(.0033)∗
 t
2   .00012 – .05u2




 t   .0115 – .0131DUMDt   ut
(.0087)†
 t
2   .0015   .0058u2
t–1   .1106 2
t–1 – .0007DUMBSt   .0019DUMDt
(.0003)∗∗ (.00097)∗∗
Long-term interest diﬀerentials
 t   –.0020   .0384DUMBSt
(.0194)∗∗
 t
2   .0003   .0241u2
t–1   .9418 2
t–1
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
†Signiﬁcant at the 15 percent level.deﬁcits are small but before they have entered a current account surplus
adjustment regime. Finally, we see that long-term interest diﬀerentials in
favor of the United States are larger when current account deﬁcits are
small.
5.5 Assessing the Present U.S. Current Account Deﬁcit
In this section we draw on our empirical results to take stock of the pres-
ent U.S. current account deﬁcit. Our empirical results indicate that com-
pared to other G7 countries, the United States over our sample exhibited
relatively wide thresholds within which current account adjustment is ab-
sent and relatively slow speeds of adjustment once these thresholds, espe-
cially the deﬁcit threshold, are crossed. Moreover, the present U.S. current
account deﬁcit substantially exceeds—and has for some time—our esti-
mated thresholds of current account deﬁcit adjustment for the United
States. We explore several possible explanations. The ﬁrst is that the thresh-
old model, while a useful description of current account adjustment for
other G7 countries, does not apply to the United States and that the pres-
ent deﬁcit of nearly 6 percent of GDP is, in fact, sustainable. The second
explanation is that there are thresholds of current account adjustment for
the United States, but that adjustment has been delayed over the past sev-
eral years due to unusual circumstances that were not in evidence during
the sample over which the models were estimated, 1979 to 2003. These cir-
cumstances could include (a) the low level of global real interest rates
(which support higher levels of investment and lower levels of saving in the
United States than would be the case with historically average or above av-
erage real interest rates); (b) the more muted and less uniform decline in the
dollar than occurred, for example, during the 1985 to 1987 Plaza-Louvre
episode (reﬂecting the intervention activities of Asian central banks); (c)
the fact that the United States continues to run a substantial surplus in div-
idends, interest, and proﬁts on its stock of foreign assets compared with
the dividends, interest, and proﬁts that it pays out on its much larger stock
of foreign liabilities; and (d) the adjustment in the net foreign liability po-
sition of the United States that occurs as a result of dollar depreciation
(which in 2003 oﬀset almost 80 percent of that years current account
deﬁcit). We review and evaluate these potential explanations for the ab-
sence of adjustment to date in the U.S. current account deﬁcit even though
it has passed well beyond the thresholds that would have triggered adjust-
ments in other G7 countries. We begin by reviewing the data on the U.S. net
foreign liability position.
Almost all claims held by foreigners against the United States are dollar
denominated, while U.S. claims against the rest of the world are denomi-
nated in foreign currency. Thus, as has been emphasized by Pierre-Olivier
Gourinchas and Hélène Rey (chap. 1 in this volume), a real depreciation of
Are There Thresholds of Current Account Adjustment in the G7? 191the dollar, by increasing the real value of U.S. holdings of foreign assets
relative to foreign holdings of U.S. assets (which, of course, are dollar-
denominated liabilities of the United States) is an important channel of in-
ternational adjustment, over and above the impact of said real depreciation
on the trade balance. This channel operates by narrowing the gap between
the market value of foreign claims against the United States and the mar-
ket value of U.S. claims against the rest of the world. In eﬀect, because of
the willingness on the part of the rest of the world to lend to the United
States in the form of dollar-denominated debt and equity instruments,
there is a transfer of wealth to the United States from the rest of the world
as a result of a real depreciation of the dollar, all other things—including
other asset prices—equal, a qualiﬁcation to which we return below. It is im-
portant to note that while the United States beneﬁts from this transfer
eﬀect that increases the real value of U.S. assets relative to U.S. liabilities,
there is, of course, another implication of real dollar depreciation, which is
the terms of trade deterioration that results from it. This terms of trade de-
terioration lowers the real purchasing power of any given ﬂow of U.S. in-
come, and it increases the relative price of imported inputs to U.S.-based
production. In addition, as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (chap. 9 in this volume)
have emphasized, moving toward current account sustainability requires
that resources be shifted from nontradable to tradable production. Empir-
ically, this channel of international adjustment is potentially quite impor-
tant in complementing the traditional channel in which the factors that
contribute to a narrowing of the current account deﬁcit also result in a real
depreciation of the dollar.
Every year, the U.S. Commerce Department reports data on the net for-
eign liability position of the United States, and it provides detail on the
revaluation of U.S. assets and liabilities that occurs as a result of exchange
rate movements as well as asset price changes. The data on net foreign as-
sets and liabilities is subject to substantial revisions. However, until quite
recently—April 2005—the Commerce Department did not go back and
revise the exchange rate and asset price revaluation attributions to make
them consistent with the revised data on foreign assets and liabilities. How-
ever, at the request of one of the authors of this paper, the Commerce De-
partment has now revised the exchange rate and asset price revaluation at-
tributions to make them consistent with the revised data on foreign assets
and liabilities. The newly released data are reported in table 5.11, and they
tell an interesting story.
We begin with the most recent data available as of the time of writing, for
year end 2003 (data for year end 2004 are preliminary). The United States
began 2003 with gross foreign assets of $6.6 trillion and gross foreign lia-
bilities of $9.2, for a stock of net foreign liabilities of $2.6 trillion. During
that year, the United States ran a current account deﬁcit of $530 billion
that, after adjustment for errors and omissions, resulted in a net capital





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.inﬂow of $560 billion. In a simple textbook model that abstracts from as-
set price or exchange rate changes, this should have resulted in a dollar-for-
dollar increase in net foreign liabilities, to approximately $3 trillion. Dur-
ing that year, asset price changes in local currency terms were substantial,
but they roughly canceled out, having a minimal impact on the net foreign
liabilities of the United States. By contrast, the exchange rate valuation
eﬀects were substantial. Dollar depreciation that year increased the value
of U.S. assets abroad by $416 billion. By year end 2003, the net foreign lia-
bilities of the United States were valued at $2.4 trillion dollars, an increase
of only $83 billion compared with the previously discussed U.S. capital in-
ﬂow of $560 billion.
Of course, a real dollar depreciation has a one-oﬀimpact on the value of
U.S. net foreign assets, and a stabilization of net foreign liabilities as a ra-
tio of U.S. GDP will require a reduction in the ratio of the current account
to GDP. However, the current account deﬁcit to GDP ratio need not return
to zero for sustainability to be achieved. Indeed, a U.S. current account
deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio in the range of 2 to 3 percent is probably consistent
with sustainability at something like the global level of interest rates and
equity valuations. Consider this fact: in 2001, U.S. net foreign liabilities
were 22.8 percent of U.S. nominal GDP. Two years later, U.S. net foreign li-
abilities to GDP had risen by a very modest 1.3 percentage points, to 24.1
percent of GDP, notwithstanding current account deﬁcits of roughly 5
percent of GDP in each of 2002 and 2003. The data in table 5.11 show that
exchange rate valuation eﬀects have been important in previous years. For
example, in 2002, the exchange rate revaluation of U.S. foreign assets oﬀset
46 percent of the foreign capital inﬂow; in 1994 and 1995, the exchange rate
valuation eﬀect oﬀset 52 percent of the net capital inﬂow. Of course, ex-
change rate appreciation has the opposite eﬀect. Of the $1.3 trillion rise in
U.S. net foreign liabilities that accumulated in the three years 1999 to 2001,
$549 billion, or 43 percent, was due to the valuation impact of the appre-
ciation of the dollar that occurred during those years.
Another factor that should be considered when thinking about sustain-
ability and adjustment of international imbalances is the longstanding ev-
idence for the United States of substantial diﬀerences in the rates of return
that U.S. investors earn on their foreign investments compared with the
rate of return that foreign investors earn and require on their investments
in the United States. That is, even though the United States is, and has been
for many years, the world’s largest net debtor, with net foreign liabilities es-
timated to be some $2.4 trillion dollars at year end 2003, the United States
still to this day earns more interest and dividends on its foreign assets than
it pays out on its foreign liabilities, even though the latter exceed the former
by more than 2 trillion dollars. Speciﬁcally, for 2004, income receipts on
U.S. assets abroad totaled $366 billion, while income payments on foreign
assets in the United States totaled $344 billion. How can the United States
194 Richard H. Clarida, Manuela Goretti, and Mark P. Taylorcontinue to run a surplus on international investment income with its large
stock of international liabilities? Diﬀerences in portfolio composition can
probably account for some of this. For example, in recent years 60 percent
of U.S. assets abroad were invested in foreign equities and foreign direct in-
vestment. By contrast, only 40 percent of foreign claims against the United
States were invested in U.S. equities and direct investment. However, in or-
der to account for the persistent surplus in the U.S. international invest-
ment income account, portfolio composition is probably not suﬃcient. In
addition, it is likely the case that the United States earns consistent higher
returns on its foreign direct investment (FDI) than the rest of the world
earns on its U.S. FDI. (See table 5.12.)
We see that in both 2003 and 2004, the United States earned high returns
on FDI, earning proﬁts of 8.7 percent of FDI assets at market value in 2004
and 9.2 percent of FDI assets at market value in 2003. By contrast, foreign
owned direct investment assets in the United States earned 4.3 percent of
assets at market value in 2004 and 3.4 percent of assets at market value in
2003. This disparity is not a recent phenomenon. As the table shows, the
United States has consistently since 1989—the year the U.S. net foreign as-
set position turned negative—earned higher returns on its FDI assets than
foreigners have earned on their U.S. investments. Table 5.12 also reports
the rate of return on non-FDI assets and liabilities. The absolute return dif-
ferentials are much smaller, and are consistently negative, indicating that
foreign non-FDI holdings pay slightly higher returns than U.S. non-FDI
holdings. Once we take into account the diﬀerences in portfolio composi-
tion between U.S. assets abroad and foreign assets in the United States (re-
ported in table 5.12), we obtain the time series on the total return diﬀeren-
tial reported in table 5.13.
Another factor that may have delayed adjustment in the U.S. current ac-
count is the more modest decline in the broad, real trade-weighted dollar
as compared with the decline in the dollar that occurred during 1985 to
1988. The Federal Reserve’s real, broad trade-weighted dollar index is plot-
ted in ﬁgure 5.1.
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Table 5.12 Portfolio shares (%)
1989 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Private U.S. investment abroad
FDI 39.7 36.8 36.4 38.4 39.6 37.5 34.6 32.0 35.9
Securities and currency 15.0 32.5 34.0 34.6 35.2 33.2 31.6 29.0 32.6
Other private assets 45.3 30.7 29.6 27.1 25.2 29.3 33.7 39.0 31.5
Private foreign investment in the U.S.
FDI 26.0 28.0 30.7 34.3 37.4 35.0 31.5 25.5 26.9
Securities and currency 34.9 40.9 42.5 42.1 40.6 41.0 42.6 44.6 47.0






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)In the three years after the dollar’s peak in early 1985, the broad dollar
index declined by 30 percent. By contrast, in the three years since the dol-
lar’s recent peak in early 2002, it has declined by less than 15 percent. Ob-
viously, the intervention by Asian central banks has limited the deprecia-
tion of the dollar against a number of signiﬁcant U.S. trading partners.
Our ﬁnal point is that the U.S. current account deﬁcit is in part an en-
dogenous, general equilibrium outcome of global ﬁnancial and macroeco-
nomic integration. As such, we believe it reﬂects a global excess supply of
saving relative proﬁtable investment opportunities. In a world in which
there is a global excess supply of saving relative to investment, we would
expect to ﬁnd and indeed ﬁnd today that global real interest rates are low
and that some country or group of countries must absorb the surplus of in-
ternationally mobile capital. Required real rates return—as measured by
yields on Treasury inﬂation-protected securities (TIPS) in the United
States and indexed gilts in the United Kingdom—are unusually low (below
2 percent as of this writing). In the late 1990s, the opposite was the case,
and rapid (in retrospect unsustainable) world investment rates surged
ahead of savings, pushing up real interest rates (TIPS yields were at 4 per-
cent in March 2000 when the bubble peaked). Although no one can say for
sure how long the present imbalance between global saving and investment
will persist, it seems clear that this global imbalance between saving and in-
vestment is contributing to the size of the U.S. current account deﬁcit and
its failure to adjust as May 2005.
5.6 Conclusion
Are there thresholds of current account adjustment? This paper has re-
ported evidence in favor of this proposition. We found statistically signiﬁ-
cant evidence of diﬀering adjustment dynamics in the current account to
net output ratio for all of the G7 countries examined. In particular, each
country displayed three regimes—a surplus regime; a deﬁcit regime in
which the current account tended to revert toward its long-run mean, al-
beit at diﬀerent speeds in each regime (showing that sign does indeed mat-
ter); and an inertia regime in which, for intermediate levels of the current
account balance between the surplus and deﬁcit regimes, current account
adjustment was negligible (showing that size also matters). We also
showed, however, that one size does not ﬁt all in the sense that we found sig-
niﬁcant cross-country variation in the size of the estimated thresholds. We
also found substantial cross-country variation in the estimated speed of
adjustment once countries cross their current account deﬁcit or surplus
thresholds.
Our results support the ﬁndings of Caroline Freund and Frank Warnock
(chap. 4 in this volume) by providing econometric evidence on the nonlin-
earities and diﬀerences in current account adjustment across industrial
198 Richard H. Clarida, Manuela Goretti, and Mark P. Taylorcountries. In line with their results, countries with large deﬁcits such as the
United States exhibit relatively wide thresholds within which current ac-
count adjustment is absent and relatively slow speeds of adjustment once
these thresholds, especially the deﬁcit threshold, are crossed. While our
analysis focuses on the relatively homogeneous post-Bretton Woods pe-
riod, Muge Adalet and Barry Eichengreen (chap. 6 in this volume) present
an historical analysis of current account reversals starting from the gold
standard period and ﬁnd evidence of substantial diﬀerences in current ac-
count adjustments episodes also across time.
We also found evidence of statistically signiﬁcant shifts in the mean and
variance of the probability distribution of several G7 exchange rates, eq-
uity prices, and interest rate diﬀerentials that occur in conjunction with our
estimated current account adjustment regimes. In particular, we found a
tendency toward exchange rate depreciation during current account deﬁcit
regimes and exchange rate appreciation during current account surplus
regimes and statistically signiﬁcant increases in exchange rate volatility
during current account deﬁcit adjustment regimes for the United States,
Japan, and Germany. This suggests that a multivariate approach involving
the joint modeling of exchange rates and the current account within a non-
linear framework would be a fruitful exercise, as well as being consistent
with substantial evidence in favor of nonlinear adjustment in real exchange
rates (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Taylor [1997]; Taylor and Taylor [2004]). This
is an avenue we intend to pursue in future research.
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This paper provides an ideal opening to this conference on current account
imbalances and adjustment in the G7 countries. Like the good paper that
it is, it both answers some interesting questions and raises several more. Be-
cause the paper deals with univariate current account dynamics, one is nat-
urally led to ask questions about what might be generating these univariate
dynamics. These questions involve both the nature of the underlying
shocks and the way those shocks are propagated through the economies.
The paper presents persuasive evidence that, in the G7 countries, cur-
rent account imbalances are more likely to decline when they are large
relative to historical averages than when they are small. In addition, the
evidence is consistent with country-speciﬁc thresholds. Unless current
account imbalances exceed these thresholds, it is diﬃcult to discern any
adjustment of current account imbalances. The evidence is also persuasive
that both average current account imbalances and the thresholds diﬀer
substantially across the G7 countries.
In this discussion, I would like to touch on some of the questions raised
by these results. I will begin with a question involving the paper’s treatment
of the average imbalances and then proceed to ask questions about what
might be behind the current account adjustment that the paper documents.
In the course of doing so, I will raise three questions about ﬁscal policy and
its potential role in helping to explain the behavior described in the paper.
The average current account imbalances (expressed as a fraction of net
output—output less government purchases less investment) reported in
the paper range from approximately –2 for Canada, the United Kingdom,
and the United States to approximately 4 for Japan and 6 for preuniﬁcation
Germany. The paper treats these average imbalances as estimates of the
long-run values to which current account ratios will tend to converge
rather than evidence of average imbalances during the sample. The paper
quite reasonably points out that there is no reason that a country’s current
needs to be balanced in steady state and presents an expression for the
steady-state current account ratio from a benchmark two-country, over-
lapping generations model. One interesting question that arises is how
closely the sample average current account ratios reported in the paper cor-
respond to the steady-state current account ratios predicted by the bench-
mark model. Of course that comparison is not straightforward because the
model’s steady-state current account ratio depends on the unobservable
rate-of-time preference. One possibility would be to compute the value of
the rate-of-time preference that would be required to equate the model’s
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Why is it that large current account imbalances—that is, current ac-
count ratios that are large relative to their mean—tend to get reversed, but
small imbalances exhibit no tendency to decline? One possibility is that
large imbalances arise when realizations of the shocks that impinge on an
economy are in the tails of their joint probability distribution. If this is the
case, subsequent draws are unlikely to be as extreme, and current account
ratios are likely to be smaller. This is not a particularly interesting expla-
nation, and it is perhaps more consistent with smooth-transition dynamics
and with threshold dynamics. The fact that the authors were unable to ﬁt
models with smooth-transition dynamics to the data suggests that some-
thing more is behind the current account adjustment dynamics in the G7
countries.
Two explanations of reversals of substantial current account imbal-
ances—particularly current account deﬁcits—that are commonly found
in the literature are increases in private savings (perhaps driven by wealth
eﬀects) and a change in the willingness of foreign creditors to continue to
ﬁnance large current account imbalances. While it is not obvious how the
ﬁrst of these is consistent with threshold eﬀects in current account dynam-
ics, the second is perhaps a more promising possibility. It would be inter-
esting to see if it is possible to model creditor behavior in a way that is con-
sistent with the threshold eﬀects documented in this paper and with the
dynamics of adjustment documented in Freund and Warnock (chap. 4 in
this volume).
Might other forces behind current account adjustment exhibit threshold
eﬀects? Threshold eﬀects can arise when agents face ﬁxed costs, an idea
that has been fruitfully applied to a number of problems, including market
entry and exit decisions in foreign markets (Dixit 1989a,b). Another po-
tentially interesting possibility that could conceivably contribute to thresh-
old behavior in current account dynamics is ﬁscal policy. Casual em-
piricism suggests that signiﬁcant political costs are incurred when a
substantial ﬁscal tightening is enacted. This might lead to legislative be-
havior in which ﬁscal policy does not adjust until ﬁscal imbalances are
suﬃciently extreme. An interesting extension of this paper would be to in-
vestigate whether ﬁscal policy exhibits threshold eﬀects.
Two countries stand out in the results reported in table 5.2, Canada and
the United States. Unlike Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the size
of the inertia region is large. The diﬀerence between the estimated surplus
and deﬁcit thresholds is nearly 4.5 percent of net output for the United
States and nearly 5.5 percent of net output for Canada. In contrast, it is less
that 0.5 percent of net output for Italy and just above 1 percent of net out-
put for Japan and the United Kingdom. In addition, unlike Japan, Ger-
many, and France, where the deﬁcit thresholds correspond to current ac-
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correspond to substantial deﬁcits.
Is there anything diﬀerent about the adjustment to current account
deﬁcits in these countries that is diﬀerent from adjustment in the other
countries? The paper provides some interesting evidence in section 5.4
when they examine whether the probability distribution of exchange rate
changes, stock price changes, and long-term interest diﬀerential is diﬀer-
ent when current accounts are adjusting. One concern that frequently
arises in discussions of adjustment to large current account imbalances
(particularly deﬁcits) is that adjustment may result in stress in ﬁnancial
markets. The evidence in section 5.4 does not suggest that increased volatil-
ity in ﬁnancial markets is associated with adjustment to large deﬁcits. Al-
though estimated U.S. equity volatility is signiﬁcantly greater during pe-
riods of adjustment to current account deﬁcits, Canadian equity volatility
is estimated to be lower (although not statistically signiﬁcantly lower) dur-
ing periods of adjustment to current account deﬁcits.
Are there other diﬀerences that characterize adjustment to large deﬁcits
that might help us understand the causes of the current account dynamics
documented in the paper? A second interesting question involving ﬁscal
policy might be to ask if ﬁscal policy in the United States and Canada be-
haves diﬀerently during periods of adjustment to large current account
deﬁcits.
The ﬁnal section of the paper asks why the U.S. current account deﬁcit
has not declined despite being substantially above the estimated threshold
for a sustained period. An additional possibility that might be interesting
to explore is whether U.S. ﬁscal policy has behaved diﬀerently during this
period than it did over the sample used to estimate current account dy-
namics.
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